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Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement: Performance Measures 
Abstract 
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued new guidance on immigration- related 
worksite enforcement. Under the guidelines, DHS “will use all available civil and administrative tools, 
including civil fines and debarment, to penalize and deter illegal employment.” According to 2010 
estimates, there are some 8.0 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian labor force. 
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for immigration-related worksite 
enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section 274A of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA Section 274A provisions, sometimes referred to as 
employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or 
continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed. Today, ICE’s worksite enforcement 
program is focused primarily on cases that involve critical infrastructure facilities and cases involving 
employers who commit “egregious violations” of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation. 
Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to civil 
monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in defendants being 
charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the relevant penalties for those 
violations. 
Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. They 
include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines, administrative arrests, criminal 
arrests, criminal indictments and convictions, and criminal fines and forfeitures. In addition to examining 
annual changes and trends in the various performance measure data, these data can be considered in 
relation to the estimated size of the unauthorized workforce or the potential number of employers 
employing these workers. When considered in this context, ICE’s worksite enforcement program can 
seem quite limited. 
Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts 
to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-
wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of 
unauthorized—workers. 
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Summary 
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued new guidance on immigration-
related worksite enforcement. Under the guidelines, DHS “will use all available civil and 
administrative tools, including civil fines and debarment, to penalize and deter illegal 
employment.” According to 2010 estimates, there are some 8.0 million unauthorized workers in 
the U.S. civilian labor force. 
DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for immigration-related 
worksite enforcement, or enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in Section 
274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA Section 274A provisions, 
sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to knowingly 
hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so 
employed. Today, ICE’s worksite enforcement program is focused primarily on cases that involve 
critical infrastructure facilities and cases involving employers who commit “egregious violations” 
of criminal statutes and engage in worker exploitation. 
Employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of aliens may be subject to 
civil monetary penalties and/or criminal penalties. Criminal investigations may result in 
defendants being charged with crimes beyond unlawful employment and being subject to the 
relevant penalties for those violations. 
Various measures are available to examine the performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement 
program. They include Final Orders for civil monetary penalties, administrative fines, 
administrative arrests, criminal arrests, criminal indictments and convictions, and criminal fines 
and forfeitures. In addition to examining annual changes and trends in the various performance 
measure data, these data can be considered in relation to the estimated size of the unauthorized 
workforce or the potential number of employers employing these workers. When considered in 
this context, ICE’s worksite enforcement program can seem quite limited. 
Enforcement activity by the Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of 
federal efforts to curtail unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing 
minimum wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its 
enforcement resources on low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and 
presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers. 
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Introduction 
According to the most recent estimates by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some 
11.5 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in January 2011.1 The Pew 
Hispanic Center’s unauthorized alien population estimate for March 2010 was 11.2 million, 
which included some 8.0 million unauthorized workers in the U.S. civilian workforce.2 It is 
widely believed that most unauthorized aliens enter and remain in the United States in order to 
work.  
In April 2009, DHS issued new guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement—the 
enforcement of prohibitions on the employment of unauthorized aliens in the United States. In the 
words of DHS, the updated guidance “reflects a renewed Department-wide focus targeting 
criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces by breaking the country’s laws 
and knowingly hiring illegal workers.”3  
Questions arise as to how rigorous and effective DHS’s worksite enforcement efforts are and have 
been in past years. The department maintains data on several measures that can be used to 
examine the performance of its worksite enforcement program. Enforcement activity by the 
Department of Labor (DOL) is also relevant to a discussion of federal efforts to address 
unauthorized employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and related requirements, focuses a significant percentage of its enforcement resources on 
low-wage industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and presumably large numbers of 
unauthorized—workers. 
DHS Enforcement 
Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)4 prohibits employers from employing 
individuals who they know are not authorized to work. More specifically, the INA Section 274A 
provisions, sometimes referred to as employer sanctions, make it unlawful for an employer to 
knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to 
be so employed. These provisions also make it unlawful for an employer to hire an individual for 
employment without examining documents to verify the new hire’s identity and work eligibility, 
and completing and retaining verification forms, known as I-9 forms. These verification 
procedures, commonly referred to as the I-9 process or the I-9 requirements, are separate from the 
largely voluntary E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, which is 
administered by DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).5 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2011, by Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker, 
March 2012, p.1. 
2 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 2010, Pew 
Hispanic Center, February 1, 2011, pp. 9, 17. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Worksite Enforcement 
Overview,” fact sheet, April 30, 2009. 
4 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, as amended. The INA is the basis of current immigration law. 
5 For information on E-Verify, see CRS Report R40446, Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification, by Andorra 
Bruno.  
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Enforcement of the prohibitions on unauthorized employment in INA Section 274A—or worksite 
enforcement—has been the job of DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
since 2003.6 Worksite enforcement is one component of ICE’s responsibility to enforce federal 
immigration laws within the United States, known as interior enforcement. Employers violating 
the INA Section 274A prohibitions on unlawful employment may be subject to civil and/or 
criminal penalties. 
The federal government’s approach to immigration-related worksite enforcement has changed 
over the years. In 1999, for example, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) unveiled 
an interior enforcement strategy, which, as explained by an INS official at the time, gave priority 
in the area of worksite enforcement to two types of cases: (1) criminal employer cases, in which 
there was a pattern or practice of knowingly employing unauthorized workers, and (2) cases of 
employers who abused their workers and who violated multiple laws.7 In the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, interior enforcement priorities again shifted. Resources 
were redirected from traditional program areas, including worksite enforcement, to national 
security-related investigations, and the primary focus of worksite enforcement became removal of 
unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure facilities such as airports and military bases.8 
Homeland security remains a primary concern of ICE’s worksite enforcement program today. As 
described by ICE: 
ICE applies risk assessment principles to critical infrastructure and worksite enforcement 
cases in order to maximize the impact of investigations against the most significant threats 
and violators. For example, unauthorized workers employed at sensitive sites and critical 
infrastructure facilities—airports, seaports, nuclear plants, chemical plants and defense 
facilities—could pose serious homeland security threats. These investigations are given a 
higher priority.9 
In addition, according to ICE, “worksite enforcement investigations often involve egregious 
violations of criminal statutes by employers and widespread abuses.” These cases also may 
involve additional violations, such as alien smuggling, document fraud, and worker exploitation.10 
ICE’s current approach to worksite enforcement under the April 2009 guidance was described in 
2011 congressional testimony by then-ICE Deputy Director Kumar Kibble, as follows: 
In April 2009, ICE released a worksite enforcement strategy designed to: 1) penalize 
employers who knowingly hire illegal workers; 2) deter employers who are tempted to hire 
illegal workers; and 3) encourage all employers to take advantage of easy to use and well-
crafted compliance tools. We carry out this strategy with the robust use of Form I-9 
                                                 
6 Prior to March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice was 
responsible for interior enforcement. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002) 
abolished INS and transferred most of its functions to DHS as of March 1, 2003. 
7 See written statement of Robert Bach, Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, INS, in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service’s Interior Enforcement Strategy, 106th Cong., 1st sess., July 1, 1999 (Washington: GPO, 2000), 
p. 13. 
8 For further discussion of these policy shifts, see archived CRS Report RL33351, Immigration Enforcement Within the 
United States, coordinated by Alison Siskin. 
9 See description of the ICE worksite enforcement program on the agency’s website, http://www.ice.gov/worksite/. 
10 Ibid. 
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inspections, civil fines and debarment, and by promoting compliance tools like E-Verify 
through the ICE Mutual Agreement between the Government and Employers (IMAGE) 
program.11 
In July 2009, as part of its new worksite enforcement strategy, ICE announced it was launching a 
new initiative to increase inspections, or audits, of business owners’ I-9 records (see above) to 
determine whether they were in compliance with employment eligibility verification laws and 
regulations. According to ICE, “inspections are one of the most powerful tools the federal 
government has to enforce employment and immigration laws.”12 
In his 2011 congressional testimony on worksite enforcement, then-ICE Deputy Director Kibble 
stated that the agency was “focused on criminally investigating and prosecuting employers who 
exploit or abuse their employees and have a history of knowingly and repeatedly employing an 
illegal workforce.”13 More recently, an ICE official testified at a 2013 congressional hearing that 
the agency “prioritizes the criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly hire undocumented 
workers, abuse and exploit their workers, engage in the smuggling or trafficking of their alien 
workforce, or facilitate document or benefit fraud.”14 
Penalties 
As discussed above, employers who violate INA prohibitions on the unlawful employment of 
aliens may be subject to civil and/or criminal penalties. 
Civil Penalties 
Under INA Section 274A, civil money penalties can be imposed for failing to comply with the I-9 
employment verification requirements and for knowingly hiring, recruiting or referring for a fee, 
or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien.15 A person or entity determined to have violated 
the I-9 requirements may be subject to a fine of not less than $110 and not more than $1,100 for 
each individual with respect to whom a violation occurred. A person or entity found to have 
engaged in hiring, recruiting, referring, or employing violations may be subject to a cease and 
desist order and to fines, as follows: 
                                                 
11 Written statement of ICE Deputy Director Kumar Kibble for U.S. Congress, House Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, ICE Worksite Enforcement - Up to the Job?, hearing, 112th 
Cong., 1st sess., January 26, 2011, pp. 2-3, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Kibble01262011.pdf (hereinafter 
cited as Hearing statement of Kumar Kibble, January 26, 2011). The ICE website contains information about the ICE 
IMAGE program, http://www.ice.gov/image/. 
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “652 Businesses Nationwide 
Being Served with Audit Notices Today,” news release, July 1, 2009. According to the news release, ICE was issuing 
Notices of Inspection (NOIs) to 652 businesses nationwide, which had been selected “for inspection as a result of leads 
and information obtained through other investigative means.” 
13 Hearing statement of Kumar Kibble, January 26, 2011, p. 2. 
14 Written statement of ICE official James A. Dinkins, for U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Border Security: Frontline Perspectives on Progress and Remaining Challenges, hearing, 113th 
Cong., 1st sess., April 10, 2013, pp. 6, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/border-security-frontline-perspectives-on-
progress-and-remaining-challenges.  
15 Current fine amounts are set forth in 8 C.F.R. §274a.10. They reflect increases that took effect in 1999 and 2008 
pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (in P.L. 104-134, April 26, 1996). 
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• for a first offense, not less than $275 and not more than $2,200 for each 
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27, 
2008, and not less than $375 and not more than $3,200 for each unauthorized 
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008; 
• for a second offense, not less than $2,200 and not more than $5,500 for each 
unauthorized alien with respect to whom the offense occurred before March 27, 
2008, and not less than $3,200 and not more than $6,500 for each unauthorized 
alien with respect to whom the offense occurred on or after March 27, 2008; and 
• for more than two offenses, not less than $3,300 and not more than $11,000 for 
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or later offense occurred 
before March 27, 2008, and not less than $4,300 and not more than $16,000 for 
each unauthorized alien with respect to whom the third or subsequent offense 
occurred on or after March 27, 2008. 
If ICE believes that an employer has committed a civil violation, the agency may issue the 
employer a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF). A NIF may result in a Final Order for civil money 
penalties, a settlement, or a dismissal. 
Criminal Penalties 
Under INA Section 274A, employers convicted of having engaged in a pattern or practice of 
knowingly hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens may face criminal fines and/or 
imprisonment. They may be fined not more than $3,000 for each unauthorized alien with respect 
to whom the violation occurred and/or imprisoned for not more than six months for the entire 
pattern or practice. 
Criminal investigations may result in employers and other individuals being charged with crimes 
other than unlawful employment, such as document fraud or harboring unauthorized aliens, and 
being subject to the relevant penalties for those violations. 
Program Performance 
A variety of measures can be used to assess the performance of the DHS worksite enforcement 
program. Over the years, such assessments have been complicated by data reporting problems, 
the existence of conflicting data, and other issues. Unless otherwise noted, all data presented here 
were provided directly to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) by ICE. The paucity of 
comparable and/or reliable data for the pre-ICE worksite enforcement program, as indicated by 
ICE to CRS, however, limits the ability to place the recent performance data in historical context. 
Administrative Fines 
As discussed above, INA Section 274A establishes civil penalties for violations of the I-9 
requirements and for unlawful employment. Table 1 provides annual data on Final Orders for 
civil money penalties (also known as civil or administrative fines) for FY1999 through FY2012. 
It shows that after increasing between FY1999 and FY2000, the number of Final Orders and 
associated administrative fines decreased from FY2000 to FY2004. In FY2006, both measures 
equaled “0.” Since FY2006, both measures have posted gains.  
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Table 1 reflects changes over the years in the use of administrative fines as an enforcement tool. 
As noted above, the new DHS worksite enforcement strategy makes increased use of civil fines. 
In written testimony for a 2009 House hearing, Marcy Forman, then director of the ICE Office of 
Investigations, discussed ICE’s renewed focus on civil fines: 
In crafting our worksite enforcement strategy, ICE has restructured the worksite 
administrative fine process to build a more vigorous program. ICE has established and 
distributed to all field offices guidance about the issuance of administrative fines and 
standardized criteria for the imposition of such fines. We expect that the increased use of the 
administrative fines process will result in meaningful penalties for those who engage in the 
employment of unauthorized workers.16 
Despite the increases in recent years, however, the number of Final Orders for civil money 
penalties remains very low relative to the number of U.S. employers. Employers receiving Final 
Orders in any year shown in Table 1 represent less than .01% of U.S. employers.17 
Table 1. Final Orders and Administrative Fines, FY1999-FY2012 
Fiscal  
Year 
Number of Final  
Orders Issued 
Administrative  
Fines Imposed 
1999 215 $1,674,672 
2000 312 $3,337,472 
2001 297 $2,037,509 
2002 91 $485,128 
2003 52 $289,814 
2004 10 $90,249 
2005 10 $455,870 
2006 0 $0 
2007 2 $26,560 
2008 18 $675,209 
2009 52 $1,033,291 
2010 237 $6,956,026 
2011 385 $10,463,988 
2012 495 $12,475,575 
                                                 
16 Written statement of Marcy M. Forman for U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security, Priorities Enforcing Immigration Law, hearing, 111th Congress, 1st sess., April 2, 2009. For a 
contrary view about the usefulness of administrative fines, see written statement of ICE official Matthew Allen, in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs, Is the Federal Government 
Doing All It Can to Stem the Tide of Illegal Immigration?, hearing, 109th Congress, 2nd sess., July 25, 2006 
(Washington: GPO, 2007), pp. 43-53. 
17 According to U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) annual data, there were 5.7 million firms in 
the United States in 2010. A firm is defined as “a business organization consisting of one or more domestic 
establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or control.” SUSB data and 
definitions are available at http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/. 
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Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, May 3, 2012 (FY1999-FY2008) and April 4, 2013 (FY2009-FY2012). 
Note: “Administrative Fines Imposed” is the same as ICE’s measure of “Final Order Amounts.”  
Administrative and Criminal Arrests 
Administrative and criminal arrests are other measures of worksite enforcement activity. 
Administrative arrests are for civil violations of the INA, such as being illegally present in the 
United States. Only a noncitizen can be the subject of an administrative arrest, which represents 
an initial step in the process of removing an alien from the United States. It seems reasonable to 
assume that most individuals arrested on administrative charges are non-managerial employees. 
Criminal arrests include arrests for illegal hiring as well as for identity theft, alien harboring, 
money laundering, and other criminal violations. Citizens and noncitizens alike can be the subject 
of criminal arrests, as can non-managerial employees, managerial employees, and employers. 
Table 2. Administrative and Criminal Arrests in Worksite Enforcement Operations, 
FY2003-FY2012 
Fiscal  
Year 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Administrative Charges 
Number of Individuals Arrested  
on Criminal Charges 
2003 445 72 
2004 685 165 
2005 1,116 176 
2006 3,667 716 
2007 4,077 863 
2008 5,184 1,103 
2009 1,644 410 
2010 1,224 393 
2011 1,471 713 
2012 1,118 520 
Sources: CRS presentation of data from written statement of the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, February 28, 2007 (FY2003-
FY2004); and from Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, July 1, 2008 
(FY2005-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and April 4, 2013 (FY2009-FY2012). 
Note: The same individual may be the subject of an administrative arrest and a criminal arrest. 
During each year from FY2003 to FY2008, as shown in Table 2, the number of administrative 
and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations increased; some of the yearly changes, as 
from FY2005 to FY2006, were marked. In 2008 congressional testimony, DHS Secretary Michael 
Chertoff highlighted the number of administrative and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement 
operations in FY2007 as evidence of the progress being made by ICE on the worksite 
enforcement front.18  
                                                 
18 See written statement of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff for U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Homeland Security Oversight, hearing, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 2008. 
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Between FY2008 and FY2009, as indicated in Table 2, the number of individuals arrested on 
administrative and criminal charges plummeted. Since FY2009, there has been no consistent 
trend in the number of administrative or criminal arrests, but the number of both types of arrests 
in FY2012 was well below the FY2008 level. The reasons for the overall decreases in 
administrative and criminal arrests between FY2008 and FY2012 are unclear, but they may 
reflect, to some degree, ICE’s stated renewed focus on employers. 
In his 2011 House testimony, then-ICE Deputy Director Kibble responded to concerns expressed 
by some Members of Congress about the diminished number of administrative arrests in worksite 
enforcement operations: 
The number of administrative arrests at worksites cannot, and should not, be considered in a 
vacuum. For the past two years, our worksite efforts have been part of a broader enforcement 
strategy that has seen the removal of more individuals from the United States than at any 
other time in the agency’s history. ICE is apprehending, detaining, and removing an 
unprecedented number of individuals who are unlawfully present in the country—regardless 
of where they are apprehended.19 
ICE worksite enforcement arrest statistics for FY2009 and FY2010 provided to CRS contain 
employment position titles for most individuals who were arrested on administrative or criminal 
charges.20 Of the 1,647 total worksite enforcement administrative arrests in FY2009, employment 
position information is available for 1,153 individuals.21 Non-managerial employees accounted 
for 1,112 of these 1,153 arrests (96%), while managerial employees with position titles that 
included owner, manager, and corporate official accounted for the remaining 41 arrests (4%). Of 
the 1,217 total administrative arrests in FY2010, employment position information is available for 
897 individuals.22 Non-managerial employees accounted for 821 of these 897 arrests (92%), 
while managerial employees accounted for the remaining 76 arrests (8%).23 
With respect to worksite enforcement criminal arrests, employment position information is 
available for 403 of the 444 individuals arrested on criminal charges in FY2009.24 These 403 
individuals included 289 non-managerial employees (72%) and 114 managerial employees with 
position titles that included owner, manager, and corporate official (28%). Of the 448 individuals 
arrested on criminal charges in FY2010, employment position information is available for 385.25 
Non-managerial employees accounted for 189 of these 385 arrests (49%), while managerial 
employees accounted for 196 criminal arrests (51%). Thus, while the number of overall criminal 
arrests in worksite enforcement operations was quite similar between FY2009 and FY2010, the 
                                                 
19 Hearing statement of Kumar Kibble, January 26, 2011, p. 4. 
20 ICE worksite enforcement arrest statistics grouped by position provided by ICE Office of Congressional Relations to 
CRS, May 27, 2010 (FY2009 statistics, as of October 29, 2009), and February 10, 2011 (FY2010 statistics, as of 
February 9, 2011).  
21 The 1,153 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no 
worksite involvement. 
22 The 897 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
23 Percentages do not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
24 The 403 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
25 The 385 figure excludes individuals arrested in worksite enforcement operations who were found to have no worksite 
involvement. 
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number of managerial employees among the arrestees increased from 114 to 196. This increase, 
which is in line with ICE’s stated focus in the worksite enforcement area on criminally 
investigating and prosecuting employers who knowingly employ unauthorized workers, follows a 
decline in criminal arrests among managerial employees between FY2008 and FY2009. The 
comparable number of managerial employee criminal arrests in FY2008 was 135, according to 
ICE.26  
For FY2012, as for FY2010, it seems that about half of the individuals who were criminally 
arrested in connection with worksite enforcement investigations were managerial employees. 
According to ICE, 240 (46%) of the 520 individuals arrested on criminal charges in FY2012 were 
owners, managers, supervisors, or human resources personnel.27  
Viewed more broadly, ICE administrative and criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations 
represent a very small percentage of the potential population of violators. For example, Table 2 
shows a high of 5,184 administrative arrests in worksite operations in FY2008. That year, 
according to the Pew Hispanic Center, there were an estimated 8.3 million unauthorized aliens in 
the U.S. civilian labor force.28 With respect to criminal arrests, the potential population of 
employers and workers committing worksite-related criminal violations is not known. 
Criminal Prosecutions and Fines 
Table 3 provides data on criminal prosecutions related to worksite enforcement investigations for 
FY2005-FY2012.29 These data, which include employers and managerial and non-managerial 
employees, build on the criminal arrest data in Table 2. As shown in Table 3, the number of 
criminal indictments and criminal convictions rose steadily from FY2005 until FY2008, and then 
fell markedly between FY2008 and FY2009. It is difficult to draw direct conclusions from these 
data about the worksite enforcement program in any particular year. One reason for this is that 
there can be time lags between arrests, indictments, and convictions. 
Table 3. Criminal Indictments and Convictions Related to Worksite Enforcement 
Investigations, FY2005-FY2012 
Fiscal Year Indictments Convictions 
2005 254 156 
2006 411 340 
2007 750 561 
2008 900 908 
2009 361 339 
                                                 
26 Data provided by ICE Office of Congressional Relations to CRS, June 8, 2010. While the FY2008 and FY2009 
employer criminal arrest data are roughly comparable, it should be noted that ICE had different reporting systems in the 
two years.  
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Worksite Enforcement,” fact 
sheet, April 1, 2013, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm. 
28 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States, Pew Hispanic 
Center, April 14, 2009, p. 12. 
29 Comparable data are not available for earlier years. 
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Fiscal Year Indictments Convictions 
2010 349 296  
2011 489 446 
2012 329 314 
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, July 1, 2008 (FY2005-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and April 4, 2013 (FY2009-FY2012). 
Note: A conviction may occur in the same year as the related indictment or in a subsequent year. 
Table 4 provides data on criminal fines and forfeitures related to worksite enforcement 
investigations that were imposed in FY2003-FY2012. ICE characterizes these data as follows: 
Criminal fines and forfeitures include fines imposed by a U.S. District Court as a result of a 
criminal conviction, seizures made by ICE and forfeited to the U.S. government, payments 
made to ICE in lieu of the seizure and forfeiture of real or personal property, and restitution 
payments made by an employer to their unauthorized alien employees as a result of labor law 
violations.30 
As shown in Table 4, worksite enforcement-related criminal fines and forfeitures have varied 
dramatically during the FY2003-FY2012 period, although they have remained well above the 
FY2003 level in all subsequent years. In light of the various types of fines and forfeitures (as 
indicated in the above description from ICE) and associated time lags, which presumably help 
explain the great annual variability, it may be that the total for any particular year is less 
significant than the fact that criminal fines and forfeitures were being pursued.  
Table 4. Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Related to Worksite Enforcement 
Investigations, FY2003-FY2012 
Fiscal Year Criminal Fines and Forfeitures Imposed 
2003 $37,514 
2004 $2,929,000 
2005 $15,822,100 
2006 $233,044 
2007 $31,426,443 
2008 $21,978,918 
2009 $31,244,945 
2010 $36,611,320 
2011 $7,189,631 
2012 $14,205,865 
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, July 1, 2008 (FY2003-FY2007), April 22, 2010 (FY2008), and April 4, 2013 (FY2009-FY2012). 
                                                 
30 E-mail from ICE Office of Congressional Relations to CRS, July 1, 2008. 
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In summary, the data presented here offer an available, but limited, means to examine the 
performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. Some measures, namely Final Orders 
issued and administrative fines imposed, followed a downward trend after 2000 and then an 
upward trend in more recent years. Other measures, namely administrative arrests, criminal 
arrests, criminal indictments, and criminal convictions, registered increases from the initial years 
included here until FY2008, followed by significant decreases from FY2008 to FY2009. All four 
measures then followed a similar pattern of a FY2009-FY2010 decrease, a FY2010-FY2011 
increase, and a FY20011-FY2012 decrease; the FY2012 data for all these measures, except 
criminal arrests, were below the FY2009 level. The data on criminal fines and forfeitures 
imposed, the remaining measure, reveal no discernible pattern. More generally, the values of the 
various measures for the years shown seem quite small relative to the estimated size of the 
unauthorized alien workforce. 
DOL Enforcement 
While the authority to enforce the INA employer sanctions provisions rests with DHS, INA 
Section 274A does grant DOL the authority to review I-9 verification forms (see above). Under 
INA Section 274A(b)(3), employers must make completed I-9 forms available to DOL officers 
for inspection.  
DOL has separate authority to enforce federal labor laws, including the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA),31 which establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, youth employment, and other 
standards. The Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the DOL Employment Standards 
Administration (ESA) administers and enforces the FLSA with respect to private sector workers, 
state and local government employees, and certain federal employees. DOL officials historically 
have been cautious about delving into questions of work authorization in their labor standards 
investigations because of concerns that it “might impede their ability to gain the trust of illegal 
aliens who may be the victims of labor violations and potential witnesses against employers.”32  
DOL and DHS signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on worksite enforcement in 
March 2011 that delineates the enforcement roles of each agency and the ways in which they will 
work together to further their respective missions.33 The MOU summarizes the importance of 
enforcing worksite-related labor and immigration laws, as follows: 
Effective enforcement of labor law is essential to ensure proper wages and working 
conditions for all covered workers regardless of immigration status. Effective enforcement of 
immigration law is essential to protect the employment rights of lawful U.S. workers, 
whether citizen or non-citizen, and to reduce the incentive for illegal migration to the United 
States. 
The MOU seeks to avoid conflicts in the worksite enforcement activities of DOL and DHS. As 
part of the MOU, ICE agrees not to conduct civil worksite enforcement activities at a worksite 
                                                 
31 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, as amended. 
32 B. Lindsay Lowell, Susan F. Martin, and Micah N. Bump, Worksite Solutions to Unauthorized Migration, Institute 
for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, October 2007, p. 12 (hereinafter cited as Worksite 
Solutions to Unauthorized Migration). 
33 The MOU is available at http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf. This MOU supersedes a 1998 
MOU originally signed by ESA and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. 
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that is the subject of an existing DOL investigation of a labor dispute, except as specified. A labor 
dispute is defined in the MOU as a dispute between employees and managers/owners over 
employee rights, including the right to be paid the minimum wage, a promised or contracted 
wage, or overtime; the right to work in a safe workplace; and the right not to be subject to 
unlawful discrimination. Under the MOU, ICE can conduct worksite enforcement activities 
during a pending labor dispute in certain circumstances, such as when the Director of ICE 
determines that the enforcement activity is independently necessary to further an investigation 
concerning national security, the protection of critical infrastructure, or other federal crimes.  
ICE and DOL also agree as part of the MOU to work together to prevent manipulation of the 
enforcement process. To this end, ICE agrees to act to “thwart attempts by other parties to 
manipulate its worksite enforcement activities for illicit or improper purposes.” DOL agrees to 
assist ICE in these efforts by sharing relevant information. 
Compliance Activities in Low-Wage Industries 
While DOL’s direct role in immigration-related worksite enforcement is quite limited, some 
maintain that the agency helps reduce unauthorized employment indirectly through its 
enforcement of labor laws. This argument is premised on the belief that many employers who 
employ unauthorized aliens also violate labor laws. A 2007 paper by Georgetown University’s 
Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) notes that employers have different 
propensities to hire unauthorized workers, and describes a category of employers that “knowingly 
hire[s] unauthorized workers to exploit their labor.” According to the paper, “such employers may 
pay salaries in cash, failing to pay their share of social security taxes; and they may seek 
unauthorized workers because they are less likely to complain about ill treatment.”34 Thus, with 
respect to unauthorized employment, enforcement of minimum wage, overtime, and other 
statutory requirements may serve as a means of reducing the economic incentives to hire 
unauthorized workers and thus result in decreased demand for these workers.  
Some other observers, such as former WHD Administrator Maria Echaveste, however, point out 
the limitations of using labor law enforcement to address unauthorized employment. They argue 
that many employers who hire unauthorized immigrants do not violate wage and hour laws. 
According to Echaveste: 
I know firsthand that many employers who comply with other labor standards still hire the 
undocumented. Many businesses pay the minimum wage and have barely tolerable working 
conditions because there are sufficient undocumented workers willing to accept those terms. 
If we care about low-income workers in this country, we need to create pressure to improve 
their economic condition by reducing the supply of unauthorized workers.35 
To the extent that some employers of unauthorized aliens violate labor standards, WHD’s 
compliance activities in low-wage industries may be particularly relevant to efforts to reduce 
unauthorized employment as these industries may employ significant numbers of unauthorized 
aliens. In FY2008, the most recent year for which statistics are publicly available, WHD devoted 
about 35% of its enforcement hours to investigations in the nine low-wage industries in Table 5. 
                                                 
34 Worksite Solutions to Unauthorized Migration, p. vi-vii. 
35 Maria Echaveste, “Target Employers,” American Prospect, October 23, 2005, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?
article=target_employers#. 
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In FY2008, as indicated in Table 5, WHD collected $57.5 million in back wages for FLSA 
overtime and minimum wage violations for about 77,000 workers. Top industries in terms of both 
the amount in back wages collected and the number of employees receiving back wages were 
restaurants, health care, and guard services. 
Table 5. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2008 
  
Industry 
Number of  
Cases 
Back Wages  
Collected 
Number of Employees 
Receiving Back Wages 
Restaurants 3,942 $18,917,992 23,433 
Agriculture 1,600 $2,116,712 5,397 
Health Care 1,302 $11,403,813 15,768 
Hotels & Motels 875 $2,445,094 5,034 
Day Care 746 $1,058,579 3,070 
Guard Services 633 $13,595,350 13,138 
Janitorial Services 507 $3,469,956 5,417 
Garment Manufacturing 385 $2,596,986 2,278 
Temporary Help 309 $1,945,163 3,368 
Total 10,299 $57,549,645 76,903 
Source: Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division. 
Table 6 provides data on low-wage industry cases and back wage collections for FLSA overtime 
and minimum wage violations for FY2003-FY2008. As shown in Table 6, the number of cases in 
low-wage industries generally decreased between FY2003 and FY2008. Despite this general 
reduction in cases, however, back wage collections increased throughout the period. In addition, 
when considered in the larger context of the potential number of employers in these low-wage 
industries that may be violating FLSA requirements with respect to unauthorized workers, or 
workers generally, the numbers in Table 5 and Table 6, as in the ICE data tables, can seem quite 
small. 
Table 6. Cases and Back Wage Collections in Low-Wage Industries: FY2003-FY2008 
 Fiscal 
 Year 
Number of  
Cases 
Back Wages  
Collected 
Number of Employees 
Receiving Back Wages 
 2003 12,962 $39,595,382 80,772 
2004 12,625 $43,141,911 84,897 
2005 12,468 $45,783,743 96,511 
2006 11,172 $50,566,661 86,780 
2007 11,382 $52,722,681 86,560 
2008 10,299 $57,549,645 76,903 
Source: Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division. 
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Conclusion 
It remains to be seen whether the worksite enforcement strategy unveiled by DHS in 2009—with 
its focus on employers who knowingly employ unauthorized aliens—will result in increases in 
Final Orders, administrative fines, administrative and criminal arrests, criminal indictments and 
prosecutions, and criminal fines in the coming years. More broadly, it can be argued that the 
ultimate test for this strategy or any other approach to worksite enforcement by DHS or DOL is 
whether it helps reduce the size of the unauthorized labor force in the United States. 
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